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We use survey data for 247 European universities and 40 public research organizations to investigate
the effects of institutional policies on four outcomes of transfer performance (R&D agreements with
companies, patent applications, licence agreements, and start-ups established). We find that the
effects of policies to establish clear rules, improve transparency, and provide financial or non-finan-
cial incentives vary by outcome. Improving transparency by publishing the policies for licencing or
intellectual property are often negatively correlated with outcomes, particularly for licence agree-
ments. Out of three non-financial incentives, only social rewards have a rather positive effect (on
start-ups), but financial incentives are positively correlated with several outcomes. A higher salary is
positively linked to the number of research agreements and patent applications, while giving in-
ventors a share of revenue is positively correlated with licencing and start-ups. The results suggest
that the type of incentive as well as the degree of transparency of transfer policies should be chosen
to complement the main transfer channels and strategy of the institution.
Keywords: technology transfer; institutional policies; university by-laws.
1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s an increasing stream of publications
has investigated the knowledge and technology transfer
performance of universities and public research institu-
tions and the effect of different policies on performance.
Awareness among university administrators and policy
makers about the importance of regulations governing
knowledge transfer activities has also risen. Yet there is
little evidence on the effectiveness of policies for speciﬁc
outcomes.
This is of particular concern for Europe, where national
laws and institutional regulations on the ownership and
transfer of academic research results are still subject to
change (Geuna and Rossi 2011). To encourage good
practice, in 2008 the European Commission (EC) issued
recommendations for a Code of Practice (COP) containing
18 guidelines (referred to as principles in the document) for
the management of intellectual property (IP) and know-
ledge transfer activities by universities and public research
institutes. The COP includes seven principles for IP, seven
principles for knowledge transfer, and four principles for
collaborative and contract research. The goal of the prin-
ciples is to ‘better convert knowledge into socio-economic
beneﬁts’ through a more effective exploitation of publicly
funded research results (European Commission 2008: 5).
Several principles advance publishing IP and other policies
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to improve transparency. The EC suggested that European
Union (EU) member states adopt the COP principles in
their national guidelines and regulations and encourage
their universities and public research organizations to
also adopt practices compatible with the COP.
Compliance with principles 1 and 2 are required as part
of the funding conditions for R&D under the new
Framework Programme ‘Horizon 2020’ (European
Commission 2013: 53–4). The mandatory principles cover
the publication of IP policies and the provision of clear
rules for staff and students regarding the disclosure of
new ideas with potential commercial interest, the owner-
ship of research results, record keeping, the management
of conﬂicts of interest, and engagement with third parties.
This article uses the results of two surveys conducted in
2011 and 2012 of European Knowledge Transfer Ofﬁces
(KTOs) to examine the effect of several recommended
principles on knowledge transfer outcomes. Responses
were obtained from 247 leading research universities and
40 public research institutes located in 32 European
countries. The results permit an evaluation of a greater
range of policies than possible for single country studies.
Most previous research is based on a single country, such
as research using the US Association of University
Technology Managers data set (see for instance
Friedman and Silberman 2003; Lach and Schankerman
2004, 2008), Caldera and Debande’s (2010) study of
Spanish universities and Okamuro and Nishimura’s
(2013) Japanese study. One of the few exceptions using a
multi-country data set is Conti and Gaule (2011), but this
study does not include policy variables.
The analyses presented below address several gaps in the
academic literature on the effects of university policies on
the knowledge transfer performance of KTOs. First, we
examine the effect of a broader range of policies than avail-
able in other studies, with data on policies for IP, licencing,
and start-up activities. Second, we distinguish between
internal policies that affect mainly faculty and staff and
published policies; publishing a policy and communicating
its content to potential transfer clients potentially reduces
the opportunities for negotiation of terms, with conse-
quences for licencing agreements. Third, we include incen-
tives for non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts. Currently, ﬁnancial
incentives dominate the literature. For brevity, the multi-
variate analyses focus on four outcomes: two that are
closer to research (the number of research agreements
and patent applications) and two that are closer to the
market (the number of licence agreements and start-ups
established).
2. Research on knowledge transfer
performance
Previous studies have evaluated a range of factors that can
affect knowledge transfer performance, including the
characteristics of the KTO, the characteristics of the
afﬁliated institution, market characteristics, and of par-
ticular interest to this study, policies that can affect know-
ledge transfer outcomes.
2.1 Characteristics of the KTO
Several KTO features such as its age, size, and experience
of its staff can inﬂuence knowledge transfer performance.
Previous research has established that older KTOs with
presumably more experienced staff perform better (Siegel,
Waldman and Link 2003; Link and Siegel 2005; Conti and
Gaule 2011; Curi, Daraio and Llerena 2012). In addition,
the number of KTO employees has been found to increase
performance (Rogers, Yin and Hoffmann 2000; Owen-
Smith and Powell 2001; Thursby and Kemp 2002; Siegel,
Waldman and Link 2003; Conti and Gaule 2011), with
some exceptions. Chapple et al. (2005) found a negative
relationship between KTO size and transfer efﬁciency in
UK universities, and Van Looy et al. (2011) found no cor-
relation between KTO size and patent applications and
contract research. Using the Higher Education Funding
Council for England HEFCE data set, Hewitt-Dundas
(2012) argues that it is not the size of the KTO, but the
alignment of organizational support and strategic
priorities that inﬂuences success. A related factor is the
characteristics of KTO staff, with low turnover (conducive
to greater experience) and business and marketing expert-
ise improving transfer success (Siegel et al., 2003; Conti
and Gaule 2011).
Researchers have examined several organizational char-
acteristics and strategies used by KTOs, including the
autonomy of KTOs in respect to the institution that they
serve (Siegel, Waldman and Link 2003; Markman,
Gianiodis and Phan 2009; Conti and Gaule 2011), their
organizational structure, and degree of centralization of
services (Bercovitz et al., 2001; Debackere and Veugelers
2005; Schoen, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Henkel
2014), and transfer strategies (Friedman and Silberman
2003; Litan, Mitchell and Reedy 2007; Belenzon and
Schankerman 2009; Caldera and Debande 2010).
Whereas organizational autonomy seems to improve
outcomes, the effects of organizational structure and
transfer strategies on performance are ambiguous.
2.2 Institutional characteristics
Several characteristics of universities or public research
institutes can inﬂuence performance. These include owner-
ship (public–private), size, the presence of science or
medical faculties, research excellence, and business orien-
tation (Schartinger, Schibany and Gassler 2001; Thursby,
Jensen and Thursby 2001; Thursby and Kemp 2002;
Sapsalis et al., 2006; Baldini 2009; Belenzon and
Schankerman 2009; Caldera and Debande 2010; Van
Looy et al., 2011; Curi, Daraio and Llerena 2012).
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2.3 Institutional policies
Research on the effect of policies on performance
outcomes is quite heterogeneous, looking at entire
strategies or sets of institutional by-laws and practices, as
well as at speciﬁc rules. Prominent topics in the literature
are (1) incentives for faculty and staff, (2) IP policies, and
(3) start-up strategies, support infrastructure, and rules.
1) Incentives for faculty and staff. Several studies have
found a lack of ﬁnancial incentives to be an important
barrier for knowledge transfer (Siegel, Waldman and
Link 2003; Siegel et al., 2004; Woolgar 2007), while the
provision of ﬁnancial incentives has a positive effect on
transfer performance in many countries: the USA (e.g.
Lach and Schankerman 2004, 2008; Link and Siegel
2005), Italy (Baldini 2010), Spain (Caldera and Debande
2010), or Japan (Woolgar 2007). Providing a share of
revenues to the inventor’s department is positively
related to licence income (Markman, Gianiodis and Phan
2009), unrelated to start-ups (Markman et al., 2004), and
negatively related to licences executed (Friedman and
Silberman 2003).
Other types of ﬁnancial incentives, as well as non-ﬁnan-
cial beneﬁts which do not consist of direct and personal
payments to the inventor, such as social rewards, add-
itional R&D funds, or the inclusion of transfer successes
in promotion and career decisions have not been
examined.
2) IP policies. In some countries, IP ownership rules and
other relevant regulations are determined nationally and
can inﬂuence the performance of individual universities or
public research institutes (Colyvas et al., 2002; Goldfarb
and Henrekson 2003; Valentin and Jensen 2007; Conti and
Gaule 2011; Geuna and Rossi 2011). University by-laws on
IP can act as a stimulus to promote patenting (Baldini,
Grimaldi and Sobrero 2006; Baldini 2010), whereas these
by-laws have not been found to affect licencing agreements
(Gonza´lez-Pernı´a et al., 2013). Wright et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that the use of identical patent policies across institutions
can help to attract the R&D activities of larger companies.
Conversely, Okamuro and Nishimura (2013), in a study of
Japanese companies, ﬁnd that university IP policies which
ﬂexibly meet ﬁrms’ needs have a positive effect on the
number of patents and new products produced by univer-
sity–industry collaborations.
Little research has been conducted on the effect of rules
that complement knowledge transfer. A study of Spanish
universities found that rules on conﬂicts of interest are
correlated with a higher number of university–industry
R&D contracts, income from such contracts, licences
executed, income from licences, and the number of start-
ups (Caldera and Debande 2010). Conversely, the same
study ﬁnds that rules on R&D contracts that stipulate
the participation of the institution in any beneﬁts from
commercialization reduce the number of contracts.
3) Start-up strategies, support infrastructure, and rules. The
literature on institutional start-up policies covers a wide
number of issues. The existence of a start-up programme,
not surprisingly, correlates with a higher number of start-
ups (Caldera and Debande 2010). Other research ﬁnds that
different institutional start-up models generate different
numbers and types of start-ups (Clarysse et al., 2005).
The ‘low selective model’ creates internally an entrepre-
neurial climate and reduces institutional barriers, but it
offers little support and survival is left to market forces.
The ‘supportive model’ gives extensive support to
academic entrepreneurs in the pre–start-up phase, while
in the ‘incubator model’ companies are spun off in a late
stage after receiving support from the institution to
prepare them for this step. Such spin-off policies have
been found to affect the growth potential of ventures
(Degroof and Roberts 2004; Clarysse et al., 2005).
A few studies examined the effect of supporting infra-
structure and rules. The presence of an incubator did not
raise the number of start-ups from American universities
(Di Gregorio and Shane 2003), but it correlated positively
with spin-offs in a Spanish study (Gonza´lez-Pernı´a,
Kuechle and Pen˜a-Legazkue 2013). Rules on spin-off
involvement that grant temporary leave to academics
are positively correlated with the number of spin-offs
(Caldera and Debande 2010). Lerner (2004) argues that
too vigorous conﬂict-of-interest regulations can have a
chilling effect on entrepreneurial activity. The possibility
to take equity stakes can increase start-up rates (Di
Gregorio and Shane 2003).
2.4 Main focus of this research
This article focuses on the effects of three sets of policies:
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives to faculty and staff
to become involved in knowledge transfer, codifying
policies by developing written documents and streamlining
IP management and transfer practice, and the inﬂuence of
publishing policies and raising transparency.
Based on the literature review, we test ﬁve hypotheses:
H1. Financial incentives have a positive effect on transfer
outcomes.
H2. Non-ﬁnancial incentives have a positive effect on
transfer outcomes.
H3. Codiﬁed transfer policies for internal staff and faculty
have a positive effect on transfer outcomes.
H4. Publishing transfer policies so that they are available
to businesses has a positive effect on transfer outcomes
which are close to research.
H5. Publishing transfer policies has a negative effect on
transfer outcomes which are close to the market.
H1 is strongly suggested by previous research. H2 is
open to discussion, but we would expect that non-ﬁnancial
incentives could also increase commitment to knowledge
transfer. The latter could have a stronger impact on
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transfer outcomes that are closer to research, as non-
ﬁnancial incentives are more closely related to the
Mertonian norms of science (Merton 1996) than to com-
mercialization. For other reasons we might get a similar
result for H3: codifying policies will raise internal aware-
ness of IP and transfer issues and ensure greater efﬁciency
through the development of consistent practices. H4
follows from H3 by improving client expectations. With
regard to H5, we point to Okamuro and Nishimura (2013):
publishing policies might limit the ﬂexibility in dealing
with external clients.
3. Methodology
3.1 Data collection
Data were collected through two separate surveys in 2011
and 2012. Each survey referred to the preceding year (2010
and 2011). The European Knowledge Transfer Indicator
Survey (EKTIS) collected data on the characteristics of
KTOs (number of employees, age, etc), a few characteris-
tics of the afﬁliated university or public research institute,
who owns the IP for discoveries, and data on performance
outcomes for 2010 and 2011.
The surveys focused on the leading research-intensive
universities and research institutes in 39 countries
including the 27 EU member states and 12 associate
countries. The response rate for the EKTIS survey was
57.0% in 2011 and 55.9% in 2012. The second survey
used a subsample of EKTIS respondents to collect infor-
mation on institutional and national policies for know-
ledge transfer and attained a response rate of 50.0% in
2011 and 39.8% in 2012. Full details on the survey meth-
odology plus copies of the two questionnaires are provided
by Arundel et al. (2013).
The two sets of survey data were then linked. The
number of cases for analysis is increased by including
all respondents for at least one of the two surveys. If a
respondent replied to both surveys, the results for the
most recent year (2011) are used. Since economic condi-
tions, research funding, and knowledge transfer policies in
Europe did not change notably between 2010 and 2011,
any biases due to combining years should be minor. The
linked data set includes 170 cases for which 2011 data are
available and 118 cases for which only 2010 data are
available.
3.2 Variables
There are four dependent variables for performance: the
number of patent applications and three variables that
measure the potential for transferring commercially
valuable knowledge to private ﬁrms, the number of
research agreements with ﬁrms, the number of licences,
and the number of start-ups established. These perform-
ance measures have been widely used in previous research.
Although a patent is not required for knowledge transfer,
the number of patent applications is included in the out-
put variables because of previous research showing a
strong link for European universities between licencing
and patented inventions (Arundel and Bordoy, 2009).
Research agreements can be further from commercia-
lization than licencing or start-ups, but they can also
involve solving speciﬁc problems with existing products
or processes and they have been neglected in previous
work (with the exception of Caldera and Debande 2010;
Van Looy et al., 2011).
The data are based on the awareness of KTO managers
of the transfer of knowledge owned and commercialized by
their ofﬁce. As some organizations or countries permit the
assignment of IP rights to inventors, this will underesti-
mate the total knowledge transfer output of a university
or research institute to the extent that some inventor-
owned IP is commercialized through the assistance of
organizations other than the responsible KTO (Lissoni
et al., 2008). Consequently the results of this study only
apply to institutional knowledge transfer via the KTO.
In our database, 61.5% report that only the institution
or ‘companies that fund research conducted by your insti-
tution’ owns the IP, 9% report that only the inventor
or ‘others’ own the IP, and 29.5% report that IP can be
owned by the inventor, the institution, companies, or
others. We use this information to control for the possibil-
ity that inventors or others own the IP generated at the
institution. The variable OWNERSHIP equals 1 if only
the institution or funders own the IP and 0 if inventors/
others have the right to IP as well or exclusively. Company
ownership is combined with institutional ownership
because the KTO is highly likely to be aware of the
research outputs of company-funded research, since
KTOs normally draw up the governing legal agreements.
Although data are available for licence income, we do
not provide regression results for this variable because of a
lack of data over a sufﬁciently long period. The amount of
income earned in 2010 or 2011 can depend on inventions
that were made long before the survey reference year,
when the values of the independent policy variables
may have been very different from their values in 2010
or 2011.
The independent variables of interest include four types
of COP policy variables.
The ﬁrst policy variable consists of who owns the IP
from a discovery made at the institution. The variable
‘IPR owned by the inventor’ equals 1 when the inventor
owns the IP and 0 otherwise.
The second type of policy variable concerns the avail-
ability of written rules to prevent potential conﬂicts. The
variable ‘Rules on IP ownership’ equals 1 when the insti-
tution has rules for who owns the IP and 0 otherwise.
The second variable, ‘Rules for conﬂicts of interest’
equals 1 when there are rules to manage conﬂicts of
interest and 0 otherwise.
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The third type of policy variable concerns the availabil-
ity of written and published rules on IP, licencing policy,
and start-up policies. The variables for a ‘Written policy’
equal 1 when the institution has a written document for
the relevant policy, but it is only available to staff of the
institution. The variables for a ‘Published policy’ equal 1
when there is a written policy that is available both to
internal staff and externally to the public. The reference
category of 0 occurs when no written policy is available.
Separate written and published policy variables are
provided for IP, licence, and start-up policies.
The ﬁnal type of policy variable is for incentives for
the protection of IP or its exploitation. Four variables
cover direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts to the inventor: ‘Percent
of revenues’, ‘Lump-sum payment’, and ‘Higher salary’
(for each 1 if the inventor receives the incentive and 0
otherwise). In addition, the ‘Inventor share’ is the percent-
age of revenue from licencing given to the inventor. Three
variables cover non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts to the inventor:
‘Promotion decisions’, referring to taking success in pro-
tecting or exploiting IP in promotion and career decisions
into account; ‘Social rewards’ in case of awards or publi-
city; ‘Funding for research’, if additional funds for the
inventors’ R&D are provided. Finally, one variable
covers a ﬁnancial beneﬁt to the inventor’s department:
‘Departmental share’ is the percentage of revenue that is
given to the department, institute, or other unit with which
the inventor is afﬁliated.
In addition to IP ownership (see above) we include
further control variables which cover the key inﬂuences
on transfer performance as assessed in the literature.
Two KTO variables include the number of employees
and KTO age (equal to 1 if the KTO was established
before January 2000 and 0 otherwise). The three institu-
tional variables include the number of researchers
(research output is expected to be closely correlated with
this variable), if the institution has a hospital (1 when
present and 0 otherwise), and the type of institution
(1 when a university and 0 if a public research institute).
The variable for the presence of a hospital is included to
capture activity in health sciences while the type of insti-
tution is an important factor in the use of licencing and
start-ups. The full data set shows that the former is more
common in public research institutes and the latter is
more common in universities. We do not include a
control variable for university ownership status (private
or public), as almost all universities in our sample are
publicly owned.
3.3 Analytical methods
All independent variables are measured as counts. We
tested for overdispersion, i.e. whether the conditional
variance equals the conditional mean of the dependent
variable, as described in Cameron and Trivedi (1998)
and found signiﬁcant overdispersion for all four dependent
variables. This rules out the use of a Poisson model and
consequently we chose the Negative Binomial model
instead.
As there are large numbers of zero responses for pa-
tent applications, licence agreements, and start-ups (see
Table 1), we also estimated zero-inﬂated negative
binomial models (ZINB) as part of the sensitivity
analysis. The ZINB model assumes that the zero
outcomes are due to two different processes (Long and
Jeremy 2006). For instance, in our data, the two processes
could be that (1) an institution has not participated in
one type of formal knowledge transfer activities (and
consequently reports 0 output) or (2) that it participated
but without success. The two parts of the a zero-inﬂated
model are a binary model, in this case a logit model to
model which of the two processes the zero outcome is
associated with, and a (negative binomial) count model
to model the count process. To differentiate between the
two processes an inﬂation variable is needed which we lack
in our cross-sectional data set. We approximated it with
invention disclosures (for patent applications) and patent
applications (for licence agreements and start-ups) of the
same year. The results of the ZINB models do not differ
in any meaningful way from the Negative Binomial results
provided below, indicating that these results are reason-
ably robust.
Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data it is not
possible to unambiguously identify cause and effect, for
example, whether policies drive performance or whether
institutions alter their policies as a result of performance
Table 1. Key performance indicators for universities and public research institutes
Performance indicators Universities Research institutes
N Mean Median Percent zeroa N Mean Median Percent zeroa
Patent applications 228 14.3 6 18.4 38 14.6 6.5 10.5
Licenses executed 200 11.3 3.5 24.5 37 13.7 3 24.3
Start-ups formed 214 5.2 2 33.2 38 1.3 1 34.2
R&D agreements with companies 161 170.5 68 4.3 31 249 30 0.0
Source: MERIT, European Knowledge Transfer Indicator Survey 2011 and 2012.
aPercent reporting ‘zero’ for each outcome. For example, 18.4% of 228 universities reported zero patent applications in 2010 and/or 2011.
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outcomes. However, the latter is more likely to occur
in response to poor performance, which would reduce
the ability to identify policies with a positive effect on
outcomes.
The regressions were ﬁrst conducted using a dummy
variable for the survey year (2011 versus 2010). The
variable had no effect on any of the results except for
the number of licences, indicating that licence activity
declined in 2011. However, the variable for year had no
effect on any of the policy variables and is consequently
not included in the ﬁnal regressions given below.
As we included up to 18 variables in the estimations,
we also checked for multicollinearity and calculated the
variance inﬂation factors and condition numbers. These
tests indicated that multicollinearity is not a problem for
our estimations.
In order to identify the effects of the key variables of
interest on our dependent variables, we entered them
stepwise into the models. For each dependent variable,
the model 1 regressions are limited to the control variables
with subsequent models including additional variables.
Model 2 adds the policy codiﬁcation variables, model 3
the transparency rules, models 4 and 5 ﬁnancial incentives,
and model 6 non-ﬁnancial incentives for the inventor. For
the regressions for the number of start-ups, the control
variable for KTO age is not included (with one exception)
because it was never statistically signiﬁcant and excluding
this variable increased the sample by 18 cases that had not
provided this information. Each table includes the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) value, a goodness-of-ﬁt
measure in which smaller values are preferable.
4. Descriptive results
On average, the universities in our sample reported 14.3
patent applications, 11.3 executed licences, 5.2 start-
ups, and 170.5 research agreements (see Table 1). The per-
formance of research institutes is comparable, except for a
lower average for start-ups and a higher average for
research agreements. A large percentage of institutions
report zero values for each outcome, particularly for the
number of start-ups, with 33.2% of universities reporting
no start-ups in the reference year. The median values are
considerably lower than the arithmetic means for most
indicators, indicating a few institutions with high values,
particularly for research agreements.
Tables 2–4 provide the number and percentage of
universities and other research institutes that reported
speciﬁc types of policies. Table 2 provides results for
policies to make university knowledge transfer activities
clear and transparent to staff or ﬁrms. The most
common policy consists of rules on who owns the IP,
reported by 86.1% of universities. Of interest, far fewer
universities and research institutes make their policies
publicly available. For example, 69.4% of universities
have a written IP policy available for internal staff,
compared to only 29.3% who made this policy publicly
available. The lowest level of codiﬁcation is for licencing
policies, with only 26.9% of universities providing a
written licence policy and only 7.2% making their licence
Table 2. Codiﬁcation and transparency of knowledge transfer policies of the afﬁliated institution
Policy variables Universities Research institutes
N Yes Percent N Yes Percent
IP policy includes rules on IP ownership 245 211 86.1 40 36 90.0
IP policy includes rules for conﬂict management 245 123 50.2 40 20 50.0
Institution has a written IP policy 232 161 69.4 38 22 57.9
Institution has published the IP policy 232 68 29.3 38 4 10.5
Institution has a written licence policy 223 60 26.9 36 9 25.0
Institution has published the licence policy 223 16 7.2 36 1 2.8
Institution has a written start-up policy 228 89 39.0 37 22 59.5
Institution has published the start-up policy 228 39 17.1 37 4 10.8
Source: FHNW, European Knowledge Transfer Practice Surveys 2011 and 2012. Written policies are only available for internal staff, while published
policies are publicly available.
Table 3. Provision of incentives for researchers and students to protect
and exploit IP
Incentives Universities Research institutes
N Yes Percent N Yes Percent
Percentage of revenues 223 184 82.5 37 31 83.8
Social rewards (e.g. awards,
publicity)
224 125 55.8 37 15 40.5
Additional funds for R&D 224 76 33.6 37 12 32.4
Inclusion in promotion &
career decisions
224 56 25.0 37 12 32.4
Lump-sum payments 223 52 23.3 37 14 37.8
Salary upgrades 224 15 6.7 37 2 5.4
Source: FHNW, European Knowledge Transfer Practice Surveys 2011 and 2012.
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policy publicly available. Start-up policies are written
down in almost 4 out of 10 institutions, but only published
by 17.1%.
Table 3 provides the percentage of universities and
research institutes that provide incentives for researchers
and students to protect and exploit IP, while Table 4 gives
the average distribution of licence revenues. As shown in
Table 3, the most common incentive, reported by 82.5%
of universities, is to provide researchers with a percentage
of the revenues. Salary upgrades are reported by only
6.7% of universities.
Table 4 provides the average distribution of knowledge
transfer revenues by the type of recipient. On average, the
inventor and other researchers at universities obtain 42.8%
of the revenues, with the KTO receiving slightly below 7%.
5. Regression results
5.1 Research agreements
Table 5 gives regression results for the number of research
agreements. The variation in the number of cases is due to
missing responses, which is greatest for the interval level
variables for revenue sharing. The control variables show
strong positive effects for the number of researchers and
founding date of the KTO, a small effect for KTO size,
no effects for the presence of a hospital, ownership by the
inventor, and type of institution (university or research
institute).
Several methods to increase the transparency of IP and
licencing policies have no effect, including rules for IP
ownership and conﬂicts of interest and a published
licence policy. A written IP policy and a written licencing
policy have positive effects; however, they are no longer
signiﬁcant once the incentive variables are added in the re-
gressions. Conversely, publishing the IP policy is positive
and weakly signiﬁcant only when incentives are included
(models 4–6).
The only incentive that always increases the number
of research agreements is to provide a higher salary to
inventors that protect or exploit IP. A higher departmental
share of revenues also improves performance, but the
inventor share has no effect. Of note, these incentives
refer to licence income. Only a minority of research agree-
ments are likely to lead to licence income in the future,
which may explain why the security of higher staff
salaries is the most effective incentive for inventors. Of
the non-ﬁnancial incentives, funding for the inventor’s
research is negative—possibly because it reduces the need
to enter into research agreements (model 6).
5.2 Number of patent applications
Table 6 gives results for the number of patent applications.
The number of researchers has a consistent positive effect.
The number of KTO employees is also positive and signiﬁ-
cant (except in model 3). When the IP is owned by the
inventor the coefﬁcient is positive but only signiﬁcant
when we include variables on incentives as well. The
founding date is positive, indicating more applications by
older KTOs, but only signiﬁcant in two models. The exist-
ence of a hospital and the type of institution are
insigniﬁcant.
Policy codiﬁcation and transparency tends to increase
the number of patent applications. The variable for a
written IP policy is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in
models 2 and 3. Publishing the IP policy is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in models 4 and 5. Rules for IP
ownership and conﬂicts of interest are consistently
positive, but rarely signiﬁcant.
Similar to the results for research agreements, a higher
salary to inventors consistently increases the number of
patent applications. A lump-sum payment for inventors
is signiﬁcant in models 4 and 5. Giving the inventor a
share of the revenues is positive in model 6, but the
actual size of the inventor share (measured as continuous
variable) has no effect (see model 5). There are no signiﬁ-
cant results for the departmental share of licence income
and all non-ﬁnancial incentives.
5.3 Number of licences
Table 7 gives results for the number of licences. The vari-
ables for the number of researchers and the size of the
KTO are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Universities
have signiﬁcantly fewer licences than the reference
category of research institutes. The ownership of IP has
no signiﬁcant effect, but the age of the KTO and the
presence of a hospital have signiﬁcant and positive
effects in several models.
The variable for IP ownership rules is positive and sig-
niﬁcant in models 4 and 5 which also include variables for
ﬁnancial incentives. A written or published IP policy has
no effect in any of the models, but a written licence policy
Table 4. Average shares of revenues from IP by recipient
Recipients of
revenue from IP
Universities Research institutes
N Percent N Percent
Inventors or researchers from
the institution
184 42.8 36 26.3
Institution 184 28.5 36 48.1
Department, institute, or other
institutional subunits
184 19.0 36 21.5
KTO or other intermediariesa 157 6.8 33 3.6
Other beneﬁciaries 184 2.9 36 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: FHNW, European Knowledge Transfer Practice Surveys 2011 and 2012.
aKTO shares were collected separately only in 2012.
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has strong positive effects in all models. Of interest,
making the licence policy publicly available has a
negative effect in several estimations, particularly in
model 6, which includes non-ﬁnancial incentives. The
greater importance of an internally transparent versus an
externally transparent licencing policy could reﬂect the
need for ﬂexibility in negotiations with ﬁrms. A published
licence policy could indicate less ﬂexibility in licencing
negotiations, leading to fewer licence contracts. Semi-
structured interviews with companies and transfer ofﬁces
suggest that companies back off if universities’ ideas in
licence contract negotiations are incompatible with their
own views (Arundel et al., 2013).
In contrast to the results for the number of research
agreements and patent applications, a higher inventor
salary has no effect on the number of licences while a
lump-sum payment has a signiﬁcant negative effect, but
only in model 6 when non-monetary incentives are
included. The existence of a rule that reserves a percentage
of the revenues for the inventor is strongly positive, but the
actual size of the inventor share (measured as a continuous
variable) has no effect (see model 5). Conversely, the
departmental share is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
For the non-ﬁnancial incentives we only ﬁnd a weak
negative effect for giving more research funds to the
inventors as a premium for being involved in transfers
(model 6).
5.4 Number of start-ups established
Table 8 gives the results for the number of start-ups estab-
lished in the previous year. The variables for the number
of researchers and KTO employees are positive and signiﬁ-
cant. The variable for university is positive, indicating that
universities produce more start-ups than research institutes
(5.2 compared to 1.3, see Table 1 above). When the IP is
owned by the inventor, the coefﬁcient is consistently
negative and signiﬁcant in several models. This could
suggest that owning inventors are less interested in estab-
lishing start-ups, perhaps preferring to licence inventions.
Though there is no effect for this variable on the number
of licences in Table 7, this explanation is still possible, as
Table 7 covers licence agreements of the institution,
whereas we would have to look at licence contracts of
Table 5. Number of research agreements
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
N 159 148 148 123 123 141
AIC 1,909.98 1,780.34 1,783.91 1,496.65 1,496.74 1,699.98
Number of researchers 0.375*** 0.384*** 0.377*** 0.268*** 0.289*** 0.319***
Number of KTO employees 0.019** 0.001 0.002 0.023* 0.020* 0.007
Presence of Hospitala 0.200 0.221 0.208 0.306 0.347 0.272
Universityb 0.000 0.036 0.026 0.312 0.254 0.147
IPR owned by inventorc 0.243 0.204 0.214 0.180 0.215 0.173
KTO aged 0.421** 0.437** 0.446*** 0.310 0.345* 0.423**
Policy codiﬁcation and transparency
Written IP policy 0.592*** 0.594*** 0.051 0.081 0.304
Published IP policy 0.260 0.245 0.574** 0.544** 0.415*
Written licence policy 0.451** 0.444** 0.134 0.147 0.338
Published licence policy 0.368 0.381 0.623 0.585 0.187
IP ownership rules 0.163 0.078 0.006 0.641
Conﬂict of interest rules 0.053 0.161 0.155 0.134
Inventor incentives
Percent of revenuese 0.230 0.096
Lump-sum paymente 0.339 0.383* 0.322
Higher salarye 0.998** 0.818** 0.947***
Revenue sharing
Departmental share 0.014*** 0.015***
Inventor share 0.005
Non-ﬁnancial inventor incentives
Promotion decisionse 0.300
Funding for researche 0.415**
Social rewardse 0.078
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
aReference category is no hospital.
bReference category is a research institute.
cReference category is IP owned by the institute or by ﬁrms.
dReference category is establishment after 2000.
eBinary variables where 1=use of incentive.
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inventors (not available) to properly evaluate the
argument. However, another explanation could be that
our survey respondents (the KTOs) are not fully aware
of all start-ups, particularly if inventors own the IP and
establish start-ups outside the purview of the KTO.
With the exception of IP ownership rules, policy codiﬁ-
cation and transparency reduces the number of start-ups.
The variable for a published IP policy is consistently
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Neither a written
nor published start-up policy has any effect. Rules for
conﬂicts of interest are consistently negative, suggesting
that these dampen the interest of university staff in
participating in start-ups.
A higher salary has strong negative effects in models 4
and 5, possibly because an increase in salary reduces
inventor interest in supporting a start-up. Giving the
inventors a share of the revenue raises the number of
start-ups as well (model 6) and the size of this share
also seems to matter (model 5). The departmental share
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of start-ups.
Similar to the results for licence agreements, social
rewards to the inventors have a statistically signiﬁcant
and positive effect on the number of start-ups. The social
award effect could be due to the prestige of establishing
a company. However, funding for the inventor’s research
has a negative effect, suggesting that it reduces the
incentives for inventors to establish a start-up or provide
support for an independent start-up that uses the in-
ventor’s IP.
5.5 Does policy drive performance or vice versa?
For both licences and start-ups, publishing the licence and
start-up policies either reduces the number of outcomes
(as for licences) or has no effect (for start-up policies).
A possible explanation for these results is that poorly per-
forming KTOs try to improve their performance by imple-
menting publication policies, perhaps as part of marketing
transfer opportunities. This hypothesis is difﬁcult to test
with the available cross-sectional data. One option is to
conduct separate regressions for KTOs that perform
below and above the median in terms of the number of
licences or start-ups per 1,000 researchers. If publishing a
policy reduces outcomes for both groups, then it is unlikely
that the cause is due to a change in policy by poor
performers to improve their performance. However, if
publishing a policy has a negative statistical effect in the
poor performing group and a positive effect in the high
Table 6. Number of patent applications
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
N 213 203 202 158 158 191
AIC 1,494.15 1,419.63 1,409.69 1,101.42 1,101.53 1,345.64
Number of researchers 0.255*** 0.277*** 0.291*** 0.163*** 0.170** 0.245***
Number of KTO employees 0.023*** 0.017** 0.013 0.024*** 0.023** 0.014*
Presence of Hospitala 0.045 0.010 0.084 0.278 0.317 0.123
Universityb 0.031 0.065 0.057 0.133 0.074 0.088
IPR Owned by inventorc 0.238 0.243 0.259 0.326* 0.350* 0.306*
KTO aged 0.245 0.270* 0.224 0.299 0.377** 0.233
Policy codiﬁcation and transparency
Written IP policy 0.581*** 0.451** 0.176 0.234 0.166
Published IP policy 0.086 0.090 0.424** 0.397* 0.276
IP ownership rules 0.244 0.303 0.356 0.173
Conﬂict of interest rules 0.333** 0.266 0.266 0.231
Inventor incentives
Percent of revenuese 0.255 0.500**
Lump-sum paymente 0.429** 0.479** 0.244
Higher salarye 1.346*** 1.189*** 0.737**
Revenue sharing
Departmental share 0.002 0.001
Inventor share 0.005
Non-ﬁnancial inventor incentives
Promotion decisionse 0.101
Funding for researche 0.096
Social rewardse 0.184
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
aReference category is no hospital.
bReference category is a research institute.
cReference category is IP owned by the institute or by ﬁrms.
dReference category is establishment after 2000.
eBinary variables where 1=use of incentive.
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performing group, then the poor performers could be
implementing publication policies to improve their
performance.
Table 9 provides summary results for a test of this
hypothesis (the estimations include the control variables,
but for simplicity they are excluded from Table 9). The
results in the ﬁrst half of Table 9 show that publishing
the licence policy has a signiﬁcant negative effect on the
number of licences for both the poor and good performing
groups, while the coefﬁcients for publishing the IP policy
are consistently positive, but only statistically signiﬁcant
for the below median group. The second half of Table 9
gives the results for KTOs that perform below and
above the median for start-ups. The results show that pub-
lishing the IP policy is signiﬁcantly negative for the
group above the median but not for the group below the
median. Publishing the start-up policy is not statistically
signiﬁcant in both groups, but the effect is negative in
all but one model. These results do not suggest that poor
performing KTOs publish their policies to improve their
performance.
6. Discussion and conclusions
This article uses survey data to examine the correlation
between policies that are expected to support knowledge
transfer and four knowledge transfer outcomes for leading
European universities and public research institutes. The
four outcomes are the number of patent applications,
research agreements, licences, and start-ups established in
the year preceding the survey. The patent application
outcome is the furthest from the market, but is a key
goal for many universities and research institutes because
of the positive link between patenting activity and licence
income. Research agreements can produce discoveries that
can be quickly commercialized, or they may produce
results that will take a long time, if ever, to be commer-
cially valuable. In contrast, licences and start-ups are much
closer to the market. Firms will not licence a discovery
without an expectation of future commercial
opportunities, and private investors will similarly expect
a future return from start-ups, even though many start-
ups will fail.
Table 7. Number of licenses
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
N 197 184 183 146 146 173
AIC 1,262.16 1,149.93 1,145.30 925.55 935.25 1,094.18
Number of researchers 0.172*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.084** 0.129*** 0.189***
Number of KTO employees 0.034*** 0.018** 0.017** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.017*
Presence of Hospitala 0.287 0.411* 0.374 0.388 0.424* 0.446*
Universityb 0.469** 0.463** 0.455** 0.530** 0.506* 0.673***
IPR owned by inventorc 0.083 0.112 0.108 0.229 0.242 0.095
KTO aged 0.355** 0.215 0.198 0.389** 0.520*** 0.152
Policy codiﬁcation and transparency
Written IP policy 0.266 0.178 0.069 0.203 0.106
Published IP policy 0.282 0.286 0.034 0.023 0.253
Written licence policy 0.948*** 0.927*** 0.674*** 0.741*** 0.928***
Published licence policy 0.648* 0.666* 0.481 0.403 0.855**
IP ownership rules 0.217 0.974** 0.982** 0.184
Conﬂict of interest rules 0.083 0.066 0.036 0.005
Inventor incentives
Percent of revenuese 1.187*** 1.165***
Lump-sum paymente 0.279 0.204 0.401**
Higher salarye 0.347 0.157 0.445
Revenue sharing
Departmental share 0.017*** 0.015**
Inventors share 0.006
Non-ﬁnancial inventor incentives
Promotion decisionse 0.119
Funding for researche 0.334*
Social rewardse 0.354*
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
aReference category is no hospital.
bReference category is a research institute.
cReference category is IP owned by the institute or by ﬁrms.
dReference category is establishment after 2000.
eBinary variables where 1=use of incentive.
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Table 8. Number of start-ups established
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
N 207 211 211 161 161 198
AIC 918.22 1,062.93 1,057.40 813.11 801.37 993.91
Number of researchers 0.173*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.146*** 0.202*** 0.190***
Number of KTO employees 0.011 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.019* 0.027***
Presence of hospitala 0.394* 0.540** 0.644*** 0.596** 0.474* 0.724**
Universityb 1.102*** 1.493*** 1.474*** 1.287*** 1.040*** 1.450***
IPR owned by inventorc 0.291 0.310* 0.302* 0.350* 0.211 0.157
KTO aged 0.094
Policy codiﬁcation and transparency
Written IP policy 0.112 0.058 0.165 0.503* 0.348
Published IP policy 0.605*** 0.604*** 0.593** 0.816*** 0.426*
Written start-up policy 0.202 0.168 0.090 0.030 0.073
Published start-up policy 0.181 0.121 0.067 0.090 0.072
IP ownership rules 0.752** 0.956** 1.038** 0.694*
Rules for conﬂict of interest 0.414** 0.385** 0.204 0.559***
Inventor incentives
Percent of revenuese 0.198 0.895***
Lump-sum paymente 0.085 0.210 0.033
Higher salarye 0.745* 1.103** 0.196
Revenue sharing
Departmental share 0.005 0.003
Inventors share 0.023***
Non-ﬁnancial incentives
Promotion decisionse 0.093
Funding for researche 0.510***
Social rewardse 0.763***
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
aReference category is no hospital.
bReference category is a research institute.
cReference category is IP owned by the institute or by ﬁrms.
dReference category is establishment after 2000.
eBinary variables where 1=use of incentive.
Table 9. Number of licenses and start-ups by group performance
Above median performance Below median performance
Model 1a 2a 1b 2b
Number of license agreements
Written IP policy 0.088 0.106 0.758* 0.718
Published IP policy 0.433 0.433 0.694* 0.674
Written licence policy 0.675*** 0.658** 0.854** 0.843**
Published licence policy 0.859* 0.851* 2.710** 2.627**
IP ownership rules 0.111 0.273
Conﬂict of interest rules 0.037 0.121
N 92 91 92 92
Number of startups
Written IP policy 0.217 0.177 0.194 0.325
Published IP policy 0.608** 0.625** 0.085 0.047
Written start-up policy 0.107 0.031 0.982** 1.160**
Published start-up policy 0.436 0.280 0.133 0.115
IP ownership rules 0.713* 1.521
Conﬂict of interest rules 0.548** 0.543
N 109 109 102 102
*P< 0.10, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
The median is 2.5 per 1,000 researchers for license agreements and 0.96 per 1,000 researchers for start-ups. The drop
in cases is due to unreported values for the independent variables.
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6.1 Codifying and publishing IP and transfer policies
The European Commission’s (2008) principles for know-
ledge transfer policies stress the value of speciﬁc policies,
examined in this study, for supporting knowledge transfer
outcomes that lead to commercialization. These include
clear IP ownership and conﬂict of interest rules to
minimize disputes, the codiﬁcation and publication of
policies for IP, licencing and start-ups, and incentives
that encourage inventors to protect IP and support its
exploitation by ﬁrms. After controlling for several charac-
teristics of the KTO and the number of researchers in the
university or research institute, we ﬁnd that none of these
policies have a consistently positive correlation with all
four outcomes. A few policies tend to show more
negative than positive effects, while the beneﬁts of other
policies vary by the type of outcome. The fact that we are
unable to detect generalizable (across all outcomes) and
positive effects suggests that (1) more research is needed
on institutional policies and their effects and (2) that the
COP should be implemented carefully until we have better
understanding of how policies affect performance.
Clear rules on IP ownership have positive beneﬁts for
the two outcomes that are closest to commercialization,
possibly because they make it easier to determine who is
to receive a share of future revenue from licencing or start-
ups. In contrast, conﬂict of interest rules have no effect
on licencing but a strong negative effect on the number
of start-ups (as suggested by Lerner 2004). We do not
know the reasons behind this, but possibly such rules dis-
courage engagement in start-ups or are a proxy for an
unfavourable institutional environment for academic
entrepreneurship. This result conﬂicts with Caldera and
Debande (2010), who ﬁnd that rules for conﬂicts of
interest have a positive effect on both the number of
licences and the number of start-ups. The difference in
results could be due to the smaller sample size in the
Caldera and Debande study, which limited the analyses
to one policy variable per regression, whereas our
analyses simultaneously control for the effects of
multiple policies.
The goal of providing codiﬁed, written policies on IP,
licencing and start-ups to the staff of university or research
institutes is to ensure that all staff understands the
potential beneﬁts of commercialization and to contribute
to consistent management of different projects. Yet the
effects of written policies are inconsistent, such that hy-
pothesis H3 is only partly conﬁrmed. Written IP policies
only have a positive effect for early stage outcomes
(research agreements and patent applications), but this
effect is lost once policies for incentives are included in
the models. Inventors that respond to incentives may
not need a written IP policy, but the implication is that
the policy has little effect on researchers that have not yet
participated in protecting or exploiting their IP. A written
start-up policy has no effect on the number of start-ups.
The only consistent and positive written policy is for
licencing, which generally has a positive effect on the
number of research agreements and a large and positive
effect on the number of licences.
The next step is to publish policies to make them avail-
able to potential transfer clients. The results show that
publishing the IP policy has a positive effect on the
number of research agreements and patent applications
once incentives are also included in the model, but has
no effect on the number of licences and tends to have a
negative effect on the number of start-ups. In respect to
publishing the licence policy, there is no effect for research
agreements, but a strong negative effect for licences, while
a published start-up policy has no effect on the number of
start-ups. These results conﬁrm H5 and partially H4 and
point to a complex relationship between policy content,
transparency, and transfer success. A possible explanation
for the negative effects of published policies is that they
reduce room for negotiations between universities or
research institutes and private ﬁrms, or at worst scare
away potential private sector investors. This supports
Okamuro and Nishimura’s (2013) ﬁndings that companies
appreciate ﬂexible IP policies, at least to some extent. The
alternative explanation that poorly performing KTOs
introduce publication policies in order to improve their
performance is unlikely, given the results of Table 9 that
show that publication policies do not improve the per-
formance of institutions with above average performance
for licencing and start-ups.
In sum, these results suggest that universities and
research institutes should carefully consider what rules
their transfer policies include and what they publish, as
the effects will vary between transfer performance
measures. For instance, an institution that aims to raise
its licence agreements should ensure that it is clear who
owns the IP of R&D conducted at the institution and lay
down the rules for licencing in writing; but it should keep
some ﬂexibility with regard to negotiating licence contracts
with outside parties. An institution that focuses on entre-
preneurship and aims to create more start-ups should
also clarify IP ownership, but at the same time avoid
crushing entrepreneurial initiative by too much bureau-
cracy, i.e. regulations, restrictions, and requirements
which complicate the start-up process and demand time
and resources which early entrepreneurs may lack.
6.2 Providing financial and non-financial
incentives to faculty and staff
The European Commission’s (2008) guidelines stress the
provision of incentives, including non-monetary incentives
such as considering transfer activities in promotion
decisions.
The results for non-ﬁnancial incentives vary by outcome
measure. Using the IP and exploitation achievements of
staff in promotion decisions has no effect on any of the
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outcomes. Rewarding transfer commitment and success
with additional funding for the inventor’s research has
negative effects on research agreements, licence agree-
ments, and start-ups. Such funding is seemingly not
suitable to keep alive scholars’ commitment to technology
transfer and their interest in cooperation with the private
sector. The provision of social rewards has a positive effect
on the number of licence agreements and a strong positive
effect on the number of start-ups, possibly because of the
prestige involved with participating in or setting up a
business. In general, hypothesis H2 is rejected, except for
social rewards with regard to licences and start-ups which
are therefore the only non-ﬁnancial incentive supported by
the results of this study as improving transfer performance.
The impact of a research premium for transfer contribu-
tions is even negative. The relevant recommendation of the
COP to support these types of rewards and in particular
include IP and knowledge transfer aspects in appraisal
procedures does not seem to be justiﬁed.
Financial incentives have disparate effects depending
on the outcomes.
First, a higher salary has a signiﬁcant positive effect on
the number of research agreements and patent applica-
tions, no effect on the number of licences, and some
indication of a negative effect on the number of start-
ups. This result could be linked to a preference among
researchers to continue working within a university or
research institute environment if there is adequate ﬁnancial
compensation.
Conversely, earning a share of revenues has a positive
effect on the number of licences and on the number of
start-ups. In contrast to Link and Siegel’s (2005) results
for the USA, using the actual share instead of a binary
variable for an undeﬁned share in the regressions, is not
signiﬁcant for licencing, although it is positive and signiﬁ-
cant for start-ups. This could be because the actual income
earned from a licence is not correlated with the share, since
the income will depend on the size of the potential market
for the invention. In this case, the existence of a revenue-
sharing agreement could be positive, while the actual share
could have no effect.
Third, the negative effect of a lump-sum payment for
licence agreements also suggests a strong preference for
revenue-sharing agreements. We also ﬁnd that lump-sum
payments interact with non-monetary incentives for three
out of four outcome measures. Lump-sum payments raise
the number of R&D agreements and patent applications
when non-monetary incentives are excluded and they do
not signiﬁcantly affect licence agreements. When non-
monetary incentives are included, there is no effect with
regard to R&D agreements and patent applications, but
a negative and highly signiﬁcant effect on licence agree-
ments. This indicates that lump-sum payments, like
higher salaries, are only effective for raising engagement
in research and IP protection, but do not raise commit-
ment to their subsequent commercialization. In addition,
even though it is a monetary incentive, it seems to have
above all a symbolic value that is less effective if non-
ﬁnancial incentives are also in place.
The results tend to conﬁrm hypothesis H1. A focus on
monetary rewards might be adequate, with beneﬁts in
terms of higher salaries more effective when there is no
immediate prospect of licence income and a revenue-
sharing agreement more effective for licencing and
start-ups.
Of interest, the departmental share of licence income
correlates positively with the number of research agree-
ments and licences but not the other outcome measures.
The departmental share is the only incentive included in
this analysis that does not focus on beneﬁts to the individ-
ual, but to a collective. The result could suggest that
stressing collective beneﬁts of involvement in knowledge
transfer strengthens transfer channels that require collect-
ive transfer commitment (like R&D or licence contracts)
but is not effective for channels requiring (mainly) individ-
ual involvement (such as setting up a start-up company).
6.3 Limitations
Our results show that institutional by-laws and practices
can affect transfer performance. However, in order to pin
down cause and effect conclusively, longitudinal data are
required that can track the effect of a change in policy over
time; qualitative data from different stakeholders of know-
ledge and technology transfer on how and why policies
and incentives have an impact would contribute to
drawing the right conclusions. European professional
knowledge transfer organizations would be in a good
position to collect such data over time from a panel of
academic organizations in Europe. Professional knowledge
transfer associations should also ensure that academic
organizations know about good practices in IP manage-
ment and transfer and that they are aware of the effects
that different rules and practices will have on different
steps of the transfer process.
In addition to the limitations due to the cross-sectional
nature of the data, another limitation of this study is that
it does not cover the full range of knowledge transfer
activities between universities or public research institutes
and private ﬁrms. Informal channels such as personal com-
munications between scientists and engineers, gleaning
knowledge from academic publications, or the participa-
tion of people from industry in academic events are not
covered as this would require surveying university re-
searchers or companies. This leads to a bias in our
results against research areas where knowledge transfer
occurs without the use of formal channels such as patent-
ing, licencing, or start-ups. Research areas that are likely
to be under represented include the social sciences,
humanities, and some ﬁelds within natural sciences and
engineering, such as mathematics, which makes little use
of formal IP mechanisms such as patents. In addition,
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asking faculty about their transfer performance and assess-
ment of institutional transfer regulations would have
the beneﬁt of learning directly about the impact of such
regulations. However, the sampling for such a survey is
certainly demanding, as we would expect a self-selection
bias and limited knowledge of the regulatory details from
faculty not involved in the transfer business.
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